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STUDENT NOTES AND REGEN T CASES
vision in Pratt v. Teffet." If our theory of the construction of the
amendment is correct then the only effect of the amendment on
the estate of curtesy is to change the husband's estate from a life
estate in the whole of the lands of which the wife die seized to
one-third thereof, making curtesy synonymous with dower only as
to the quantity of the estate to be enjoyed by the husband and not
to be governed by the laws of dower in attaching.
-J. R. D.
NUISANCES-PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY.-The determination
of the question as to what nuisances are permanent and what ones
temporary, or merely "continuing" is one of importance." If a
nuisance is permanent, the statute of limitations begins to run from
the time the plaintiff first suffers damage, and the lapse of the
statutory period thereafter forever bars an action. A prescriptive
right to continue the nuisance is thereby acquired.' If a nuisance
is temporary, its continuance is looked upon as constituting a tort
separate and distinct from its creation so that, in legal contempla-
tion, a new tort begins each week or month.2 Likewise, the satis-
faction of a judgment, in the case of a permanent nuisance, in-
cludes both retrospective and prospective damages as measured by
the dimunition in value of the premises injuriously affected, and
thereby purchases a license to continue the nuisance over the plain-
tiff's land.4  A subsequent suit for damages, as well as equitable
relief by way of injunction, is thereby barred.' In the case of a
temporary nuisance the plaintiff cannot recover damages in excess
of his injury up to the time of his suit. Thereafter, he may either
pester the defendant with successive suits for damages, or ask for
an injunction to abate the nuisance, or both.- A review of many
cases and approved text writers shows that there is practical unan-
imity as to what constitutes a permanent nuisance.7 The difficulty
" Supra, note 23.
I Bartlett v. Grasseli Chemical Co., (W. Va. 1923) 115 S. E. 451.
2 Cass v. Penn Co., 159 Pa. St. 273, 28 Atl. 161 (1893); Baldwin v. Oskaloosa
Gaslight Co., 57 Ia. 51, 10 N. W. 317 (1881).
3 Peck v. lichigan City, 149 Ind. 670, 49 N. E. 800 (1898) ; August v. marks
124 Ga. 365, 52 S. E. 539 (1905).
4 Guinn ct al. v. Ohio River R. Co., 46 W. Va. 151. 33 S. . 87 (1899) ; Har-
greaves v. Kimberly, 26 W. Va. 787, 799 (1885).
a Consolidated Home Supply etc. Co. v. Hamlin, 6. Colo. App. 341, 40 Pac. 582
(1894) ; Guinn v. Ohio River R. Co., 46 W. Va. 151, 33 S. E. 87 (1899).
' Hargreaves v. Kimberly, 26 W. Va. 787 (1885).
T WOOD, NUISANCES, § 869; JOYCE, NUISANCES, §495; SEDGWICK, DAMAGES, § 95;
SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES, § 1046.
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arises in the application of the rule to the particular case.' The
test is whether the defendant intends to maintain it permanently.
The only evidence of such intent is the nature of the structure
itself. The courts cannot indulge in conjecture or speculation as
to how long the injurious structure will be maintained.' If the
agency causing the injury is substantially built, and operated in
accordance with the latest and best known scientific methods, and
is apparently to continue indefinitely, a strict adherence to the
-stablished definition of a permanent nuisance would require that
the judgment include both retrospective and prospective damages
Satisfaction of such a judgment, as already indicated, would consti-
tute a bar to a subsequent suit for damages, and thereby virtually
give the plaintiff rights in the defendant's land in the nature
.f an easement. It is at this point that some courts refuse to ad-
here strictly to the definition, for they say, an owner of private
property cannot be compelled to sell to another private person an
casbment over his land against his consent, and much less so by a
court judgment.10 The courts do not experience the same diffi-
culty when the wrongdoer is a public or quasi public corporation,
for in such case, the plaintiff's entire property could be taken, if
need be, by a legitimate exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Moreover, such operations of a public or quasi public utility as
are necessary to effectuate its lawful purposes cannot be enjoined.
For these two reasons the courts uniformly hold that a nuisance
caused by a public or quasi public utility is permanent when the
agency causing it is substantially built, operated according to the
latest scientific methods, and is apparently to continue indefinitely.
Judgment is for future damages, as well as past, and its satisfaction
virtually purchases a right in the nature of an easement to continue
the same. But, where the agency or structure causing the nui-
sance is owned by an individual or private corporation, the courts
say the nuisance is temporary in spite of the fact that it fits the
aforesaid definition as well as a similar plant owned by a public or
quasi public utility. Is the distinction justified? Often the private
concern represents an outlay of millions of dollars and is putting
out a commodity closely connected with the public welfare and
whose production gives thousands employment. It does not neces-
sarily follow, especially in view of the present increasing tendency
to socialize the law by a balancing of the interests involved, that
S Keene v. Huntington, 79 W. Va. 714, 719, 92 S. E. 119 (1917).
Troy v. Cheshire R. Co., 23 N. H. 83 (1851) ; Powers v. Council Bluffs, 45 Ia.
652 (1877) ; Babb v. Curators of University of Missouri, 40 Mo. App. 173 (1890).
10 Uline v. New York Cent. etc. R. Co., 101 N. Y. 98. 4 N. E. 536 (1886).
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the continued operation of such a privately owned concern will be
enjoined.11 If the facts of the case are such that the continued
operation of the privately owned concern will not be enjoined,
then a court of law should not assume the inconsistent position of
allowing successive damage suits and thereby indirectly bring about
the same result by forcing the concern to suspend business rather
than buy out surrounding landowners at exorbitant prices.' 2 We
conclude, therefore, that where a nuisance, permanent in the sense
above indicated, is being perpetrated by a privately owned con-
cern, whose operation upon a balancing of the interests involved a
court of equity will not enjoin, then the damages should be perma-
nent once for all, rather than permit a number of successive dam-
age suits thereafter. The latter policy will force the concern to
close down or be subjected to the designs of intriguing landowners.
Whether or not the satisfaction of such a judgment could be prop-
erly said to convey an easement over plaintiff's land, certainly, as
the Alabama court points out, the acceptance of such damages by
the plaintiff would bar him and his privies from later
complaining.1 3  -M. H. M.
DEDICATION TO PUBLIC USE-WHAT CONSTITUTES-ACCEPTANCE.
-Dedication may be concisely defined as an appropriation of land
by its owner for the public use.1 The bounds or limits of this doc-
trine were restricted at its inception to the gift of land to high-
way uses only, but this strict application has been lost at the pres-
ent day.2 Dedication to a public use has been held to include an
appropriation of property as a common or square, 3 for use as a
cemetery,4 for educational purposes,5 for the erection of public
buildings,' and for numerous other public and quasi-public uses.
Another departure from the strictness of the original doctrine
is found in decisions declaring that the dedication need not be for
the public generally but may extend only to a limited class of
11 See note in 9 CoL. L. REV. 540; Bliss v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 167
Fed. 342 (1909) ; McCarthy v. Bunker Hill etc. Co., 164 Fed. 927 (1908).
12 See note in 9 COL. L. REV. 540.
U Highland Avenue. etc. R. Co. v. Matthews, 99 Ala. 24, 10 So. 267 (1892).
1 Winchester v. Carroll, 99 Va. 727, 40 S. E. 37 (1901).
2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, § 479, citing Lade v. Shepherd, 2 Strough. 1004 (anno.
1735).
s Sturmer v. County Court, 42 W. Va. 724, 26 S. E. 532 (1896).
, Benn v. Hatcher, 81 Va. 25 (1885).
Sturmer v. County Court, supra.
Board of Supervisors of Frederick County v. City of Winchester. 84 Va. 467, 4
S. E. 844 (1888).
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